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Summary
The poverty of most Bangladeshis is viewed as an important - but not urgent - issue by Bangladesh's elites. They
do not feel threatened by the extent of poverty, or by poor people. Some sections of the elite appear to know
little about the poor. The poor are instead viewed through a somewhat idealistic lens, as homogenous, deserving
objects of traditional elite philanthropy. Poverty alleviation is at one level viewed as a moral project. At another
level it is synonymous with the broader, technical project of development: development will solve the problem
eventually, without any special focus on the poor. The state is expected to provide education for the poor, but
not to act in any more direct way to protect their livelihoods. The proper role of the state is to promote
development in the broad sense, not to ensure that the poor are fed.
*  The author is grateful to Stephen Devereux and Mick Moore for comments on earlier drafts, and to Nandini Gooptu for
extensive discussions of the issues.
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21   INTRODUCTION
Does it matter what Bangladeshi elites think about the problem of poverty? History suggests that it matters a
great deal. Historical scholarship tells us that understandings of poverty have often affected the degree of
priority that elites have been willing to accord to poverty alleviation and the nature of anti-poverty policies they
are willing to support. These lessons from history may be very relevant to developing countries, where anti-
poverty policy is often 'owned' less by national governments than by international organisations. Here, anti-
poverty agendas based on the perceptions of aid donors rather than national elites may have failed to generate
adequate support and commitment from the elites. It is worth enquiring into differences between national elite
and international aid donor agendas and perceptions. In the Bangladesh case, these two sets of perceptions are
not very far apart, at least with respect to the policy implications. Bangladeshi elites do not accord poverty a
high priority on the national poverty agenda, nor do they view direct poverty alleviation as the responsibility of
the state. Direct poverty alleviation should be motivated by moral rather than ideological, class, or party-political
concerns, and should be conducted within the framework of personal charity or 'civil society' (including
NGOs). The main contribution of public action should be education that will serve to raise the 'awareness' of
the poor, i.e. to induce them to adopt a more activist and instrumental kind of economic rationality in
organising their lives. The redistribution of assets is not seen to have a significant role in reducing poverty.
Language borrowed from international aid policy discourses often serves to justify beliefs about the nature,
causes of and solutions to poverty that could equally well be expressed in 'traditional' idioms of personal charity.
The policy implications of Bangladeshi elite perceptions are congruent with those of most aid donors and
international financial institutions: a limited role for the state in direct poverty alleviation; an emphasis on the
benefits of education; and a belief that the state should focus on promoting national economic development, the
best route to poverty alleviation in the long term.
What are the implications of these findings about elite perceptions of poverty in Bangladesh?  On the
positive side, there is a substantial implicit meeting of minds between elites and aid donors over long term
strategy. But this implicit strategy does not give any great priority to poverty. Insofar as poverty is understood as
an issue about the productivity of human resources and thus of national economic development, the vulnerable,
'unproductive' poor are excluded. Assigning responsibility for poverty reduction to the more technically capable
NGOs and to private charity takes poverty off the political and electoral agendas. Political pressure is not
viewed as an appropriate way of addressing the issue. The Bangladeshi elite is not hostile to the poor, but lack
of hostility may reflect the distance between the two groups. The elite in fact have few direct relationships with
the poor, and no great stake in their future. Except for potential electoral pressures, and of the growing labour
needs of export-oriented labour-intensive industries, the elite are unlikely to perceive themselves as having
personal material interests in poverty alleviation. They can afford to view the anti-poverty agenda as a diffuse
moral issue, to be dealt with by those most capable and in the medium-term, than as an urgent issue requiring
immediate political action.
Section 2 situates the present research in traditions of historical and comparative research on elites. Section
3 briefly describes the research project on elite perceptions of poverty in Bangladesh on which this paper draws.
Section 4 introduces some theoretical considerations about the nature of our findings. Section 5 deals with the
3'developmental' idiom within which the elite discuss poverty, and Section 6 discusses their views on charity and
responsibility for the poor. A preliminary explanation of the elite's views on poverty is given in Section 7,
illustrating the lack of a threat to their well-being or of a sense of interdependence with the poor, and compares
their preference for non-government provision with their lack of faith in the state. Section 8 concludes the
overview of elite perceptions of poverty in Bangladesh, raising some broad issues about the treatment of
poverty in development research.
2   ELITE PERCEPTIONS OF POVERTY IN HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE
Historians offer us two alternative ways of understanding the contribution of elite perceptions of poverty to
public policy. The first focuses on the historical development of Western European welfare states, and stresses
the development of a form of social consciousness that encouraged increasingly collective and broad-based
forms of welfare provision. Poverty was thought at different times to pose a threat to elites through crime,
epidemics and insurrection (Beier 1983). Responses to these threats ranged from the repressive – e.g., the dépôts
de mendicité in which beggars and vagrants were forced to work in nineteenth century Tuscany – to charity and
municipal assistance for the 'deserving' or the 'respectable' poor (Woolf 1986). In one account, a 'logic of
collective action' argument is used to explain why parish-based assistance in Western Europe eventually gave
way to broader municipal systems of assistance (De Swaan 1988). Elites came to believe that rich and poor were
mutually dependent, that poverty could and should be tackled by the state, and that it was in their best interests
for action to be taken on behalf of the poor. Welfare provision was seen as increasingly public, state-sponsored
and administered, and decreasingly the domain of particularistic, private charitable initiatives.
In these accounts it is elite recognition of self-interest with respect to poverty alleviation which helps to
explain the evolution of the welfare state. There is assumed to be a close connection between changes in the
objective conditions of the poor and changes in public policy. More recently, with the welfare state no longer
seen as the single best solution to welfare provision, historians have begun to argue that such accounts are
overly teleological and rooted too deeply in modernisation theory to have much explanatory value (Jones 1996;
Daunton 1996). In particular, they may be neither accurate nor conceptually helpful in explaining the complex,
non-linear relationship between private charity and state provision (Introduction in Barry and Jones, 1991). Rather
than seeing the welfare state as the culmination of a progressive march from narrow, often repressive charity for
the poor, to a collectivist response to the demands of the working classes, recent approaches emphasise more
varied understandings of the motivations behind anti-poverty policy and charity.
This second approach to understanding the effect of elite perceptions of poverty involves a closer
examination of elite motivations and of debates about poverty in their specific historical contexts. Elite women's
organisations successfully promoted social policy favouring mothers in early twentieth century America
(Skocpol 1992), while the 'moral imagination' of the Victorian elite advanced a new focus on the deserving but
not the destitute poor (Himmelfarb 1991). Sandra Cavallo's path-breaking work on charity in early modern
Turin (1991) emphasises the crucial role played by intra-elite conflicts and discourses – rather than the extent of
poverty itself - in shaping the response by municipality and individual donors to poverty. Some such responses,
4for example a focus on the situation of poor widows, emerged out of intra-elite debates over patterns of
inheritance adversely affecting aristocratic women, rather than any direct concern about poor women.
It becomes clear from these accounts that shifts in perceptions of poverty may be closely linked to shifts in
ideas about elite society, and society in general, and therefore part of broader debates about society or gender
relations. Indeed, the motivations for changing policies against poverty may not even be located in the actual
conditions of the poor, as Himmelfarb has shown. In Victorian Britain, for example, a shift in focus from the
'undeserving' to the 'respectable' poor had little to do with the changing conditions of these groups, whom
statistical evidence shows were in fact becoming better-off at this time. Far more important influences were the
work of individuals such as Charles Booth, as well as sensationalist pamphlets, purporting to highlight the
scandalous and immoral conditions in which even the respectable poor were living, which successfully attracted
the attention of reforming elites (Himmelfarb 1991, chapter 4).
One important contribution of these approaches is to show that poverty policy is not necessarily driven by
the extent or the effects of poverty. Ideas about poverty vary in different contexts, and understanding
contemporary debates around poverty can help explain the motivations for taking action against poverty, and
the character of that action. Poverty policy is understood in these accounts to change randomly, not linearly
towards a welfare state.
Cavallo situates her research on elites and poverty in Turin within an older tradition, that of moral
economy studies. Elite perceptions of poverty can be studied to explore elite-poor relationships, and she views
the charitable act as the result of negotiations between rich and poor (Cavallo 1991: 59). Elite perceptions,
ideologies and discourses have similarly been themes in other studies of poverty and famine which employ a
moral economy framework (e.g. Greenough, 1985; Scott, 1990; Thompson, 1993). A concern in such studies
has often been that the perceptions, ideologies and practices of the poor - Scott's 'hidden transcripts' - have
tended to be under-researched and poorly understood compared to the ideologies and practices of the elite. The
public discourse of the elite is by contrast generally more easily available, and therefore generally better
understood.
While it is true that historians have been able to study elite perceptions of poverty in the West, little is
known of the perspectives on poverty of developing country elites. Within the development studies field the
impetus for studying elite perceptions of poverty comes from an assessment of the shortcomings of poverty
research; these include an overemphasis on the technical aspects of poverty (measurement and definition); the
tendency to study the poor in isolation from society; and in the neglect of the motivations of the non-poor in
enacting or blocking effective anti-poverty policy (Oyen, 1996). John Toye argues a strong case for
'nationalizing the anti-poverty agenda', i.e., for the importance of making anti-poverty agendas nationally
relevant, rather than the domain of international institutions (Toye, 1997). Part of the failure of previous
attempts to significantly reduce poverty in developing countries can be seen, he argues, as a result of the failure
to engage the national political will necessary to deal with poverty. Anti-poverty programmes were framed and
implemented without much reference to developing country agendas or concerns, and therefore may have failed
to attract the political support essential for their success. In this view, an understanding of how elites in
developing countries understand the problem of poverty is an important prerequisite to developing action
programmes that have a chance of success.
53   RESEARCHING THE BANGLADESHI ELITE
Some research has been done on sections of the Bangladeshi elite1, but relatively little is available in the
academic literature on elite networks and circulation in Bangladesh. Observers note that 'a very small educated
elite, connected by family and friendship, tends to dominate the decision-making process in Bangladesh' (cited
in Lewis, Sobhan and Jonsson 1994: 17). Even the most casual of observations confirms the existence of a small
and tightly-knit network of prominent people. Within our own sample we discovered that there were three
siblings whom we had not initially known to be related to each other: a senior politician, a prominent academic,
and a civil servant. 'Everyone knows everyone here' is a phrase commonly used by the elite to describe this
circle. This is an elite group highly concentrated in one city, Dhaka2, and with relatively weak rural ties (see
Siddiqui et al 1991; Khan et al 1996). In addition to the close-knit nature of this group, many of the elite
circulate between elite professional groups. Khan et al (1996) notes that 70% of their sample of political elites
were in business, with the highest concentration in the two major parties. As we found during our interviews, a
member of the elite may be a former minister, a former civil servant, a published academic, and a journalist. An
MP could also own a magazine, a manufacturing concern, and an NGO or charity organisation, while being a
member of the social elite. That these are not hypothetical examples should indicate the significant degree of
homogeneity across elite groups, as well as the ease with which ideas and language can travel between them.
Our interest was in powerful individuals, and covered both direct decision makers and those who exercise
indirect influence over decisions through their ideological power. The scope of our study thus extended beyond
state (political, civil and military bureaucracy) and business elites, and covered media and social elites,
intellectuals, NGO, religious and student leaders. Our interviewees were mostly 'national' elites, but we also
interviewed some people living outside of the two main cities (Dhaka and Chittagong), whom we have labelled
'regional elites'. We did not seek direct information on the influence of elite groups' policy. However, given the
close-knit nature of elite circles, and the extent of crossover between elite groups, that influence is likely to be
particularly strong in Bangladesh.
We selected semi-structured interview formats, and attempted to cover topics such as the extent, nature
and causes of poverty; assessments of existing anti-poverty programmes and their implementation; responsibility
for anti-poverty action; and the impact on the elite. Hypotheses and specific questions about the gender
dimensions of poverty and categories of poor people were introduced later, and we probed further on particular
issues such as education, which the pilot interview round had indicated were particularly important to the elite.
The tables included in the text below are only indicative of the responses we gathered. Despite our attempts to
direct the interviews, many interviewees had their own concerns and did not answer all our questions fully or
explicitly. An attempt to review the print media for its content on poverty was abandoned once it became clear
that, while virtually no articles were published using the specific terms of 'poverty' and 'poor people', virtually
everything which appeared in the press could be viewed as pertinent to our subject. Instead of a comprehensive
review, we opted to focus on media coverage of topical events with specific impacts on poor people: the recent
cold spell and deaths from illicit alcohol. We also directed discussions towards these and similar events,
discussions which were revealing because they helped us get beyond formulaic responses about poverty.
6One of the largest obstacles to researching elites in any context is access (Hertz and Imber 1995). In the
Bangladesh context this is compounded by the importance the elite assign to personal contacts and limited
public access to information about the elite. 'Cold-calling' was not generally a successful tactic, and the field
research team spent most of their time making personal contact and arranging meetings. This frequently
involved 'pre-interview' interviews for the respondent to vet the researcher. The research team members were
selected in part on the basis of their contacts and relationships with individuals and sections of the elite,3 and
these strategies of using personal contacts and repeated visits paid off, by reassuring respondents about the
nature of the research and the identity of the researchers. Thomas (1995) attributes his success in gaining access
to elites by his strategy of offering the respondent the opportunity to 'teach' the researcher, a strategy which also
worked in Bangladesh, particularly as the field researchers were all younger than ('junior to') the respondents.
The junior status of the field researchers also appears to have had some impact on the interviews themselves.
Most respondents treated the interviews as opportunities to explain the issues around poverty to the researchers,
and represented their views not as personal opinion but as fact. The 'vetting' procedure, personal contacts,
confidential nature of the interviews, and our junior status seem to have reassured our respondents to a great
degree, and many were extremely candid as well as generous with their time.
4   ANALYSING PUBLIC DISCOURSES OF POVERTY
The argument in this paper draws largely on the elite's public views on poverty, as expressed in interviews and
in certain public contexts such as the media. Members of the elite may hold other, less 'politically correct' views
about poverty that they keep private; however, our research strategies seemed to encourage an unusual degree
of openness. Here we treat these public expressions not as ideology, nor as reflections of the elite's 'real' beliefs,
but as distinctly public modes of thinking and talking about poverty. We limit ourselves here to how poverty is
talked about, keeping a clear distinction between discourses and practices, but will show that the way in which
the elite talk publicly about poverty should be a practical concern, because it shapes the possibilities for public
action on poverty. Scholars of policy discourse have shown how 'framing' of problems to be tackled permits
alternatives to be excluded (Apthorpe and Gasper 1996). Our story is very much one of the importance of the
'frames' of the poverty problem in public use, specifically attempting to show that framing the problem as
alternately a technical issue of development and a moral issue of private charity excludes issues of politics and
conflict.
Two of the idioms in which poverty is discussed by Bangladeshi elites are outlined below, the intention
being to show how these converge in important ways. 'Idiom' is used here to denote clusters of ideas, concepts
and language, but not holistic systems of thought. The two main ways of talking about poverty are a
developmental and a charitable or 'moral economy' idiom. These are distinct in that they appear to derive from
different types of knowledge, and give meaning to different aspects of poverty. A developmental idiom is used
to talk about the macro conditions of poverty and the identity of Bangladesh as a poor country. The language
and concepts used in this idiom derive from academic and policy debates which often originate elsewhere (e.g.,
international organisations such as the World Bank). Issues discussed within this idiom are models of economic
development, comparisons between Bangladesh and other countries' development trajectories, and state and
7NGO capacity to provide effective anti-poverty and social development programmes. But members of the elite
also talk about poverty as they observe and relate personally to it. Important in this second idiom are elite
constructions of their 'traditional' responsibility for the poor, elite commitment to assisting the poor, and the
need for social unity in anti-poverty action. While the elite tend to refer explicitly to religious rules and
'historical' practices within this idiom, these are given meaning in part by a recognition that private welfare
provision is part of an international agenda far broader than local tradition.
These idioms of poverty come into use in specific contexts, and do not cover the same conceptual
territory. Within the idiom of charity, for example, elites have well-developed and clear ideas about
responsibility for the poor. When talking about national poverty and development, however, ideas about
responsibility for poverty reduction are vague, and elites talk more clearly about capability. These two idioms do
not therefore represent two sides – modern and traditional - of the same coin, but weave together to make up
the public discourse. These two ways of talking about poverty also rarely represent poles of conflict: instead
they support each other, and are frequently mutually justifying. Talking about responsibility within an idiom of
charity, for example, is justified in part by neo-liberal emphases on withdrawing the state from direct provision.
For our purposes, it is the priority assigned to reducing poverty which is important: here we will attempt to
show how these distinct idioms feed into a discussion which reinforces framing poverty as an apolitical issue
and one which is only indirectly manageable, effectively assigning poverty a low priority. This public discourse
is represented here as fairly homogenous - partly because of limitations of space, but mainly because there seem
to be larger areas of consensus over these issues among the Bangladeshi elite than in other countries. Some
challenges to the consensus are discussed, but crucially, these serve to illustrate how perspectives apparently
emanating from very different ideological positions can actually converge to produce similar discursive
outcomes.
It was in thinking about the conceptualisation of responsibility for the poor and poverty that we first
noticed significant contradictions within public debates. The conceptualisation of poverty as a problem on a
vast national scale did not appear to fit with allocations of responsibility favouring individualised, personal
responses to the problem. This prompted us to think about the categories and meanings of poverty and the
poor being employed in different contexts. In the response to vast national poverty, for example, we started to
see that an idea of national poverty was being met with a response which the elite felt was publicly appropriate
– that of personal concern and charity for individual poor people, and which they could explain with reference
to 'tradition'. We started to look more closely at language, the sources of knowledge about poverty, and at
differences within the elite. A contrast began to emerge between styles of discourse on national poverty and on
poor people as individuals and communities. The semi-structured interview format we initially employed was
inevitably focused on assessments of poverty as a national problem, but our interview transcripts began to fill
up with detailed anecdotes and accounts of personal encounters with poor people. The elite's somewhat limited
knowledge about poverty seemed to derive from distinct sources: academic and policy-based accounts of the
macro conditions of development on the one hand, and a form of practical knowledge of the poor, and their
relationship with the elite, on the other.
85   THE DEVELOPMENTAL IDIOM
5.1 National Poverty
Within the developmental idiom, the object of discussion was usually an understanding of national poverty,
with two meanings: 1) an understanding of the objective condition of mass poverty within the nation, and 2) a
symbolic significance as part of national identity in relation to the outside world. Discussions of national
poverty drew on development orthodoxies such as poverty lines (a tool with which the Bangladeshi elite are
familiar, see Table 1), international comparisons which the elite themselves are capable of making, and the
representation of Bangladesh in the international media. These tools of comparison and measurement seem to
be the elite's major sources of knowledge of national poverty. Poverty professionals - state elites with direct
involvement in welfare, education and planning, NGO leaders, and development experts - tended to speak
exclusively in terms of national poverty, and tended to offer the interviewers 'information' (including literature)
instead of presenting their views as subjective or personal. Most other discussions featured broad, brush-stroke
assessments of the problem, characterised in many cases by their nebulous nature. Despite pockets of detailed
knowledge of poverty-related issues, proposed solutions to poverty often seemed vague, mainly because
discussions of poverty alleviation had a marked tendency to elide into discussions of development more
generally.
Table 1 :   Determinants of  poverty/ characterist ics of  the poor
Determinants mentioned Number of
responses
Below the poverty line/level 18 20%
Nutritional/ insufficient food/ basic needs 18 20%
Homelessness/ landlessness/ lack of assets 13 15%
Low income/ unemployment 12 14%
Lack of education/ consciousness 8 9%
Inability to defend rights/ dependency/ fatalism 7 8%
Lack of access to safe water/ sanitation 6 7%
Other 6 7%
Total 88 100%
That some ideas about national poverty derive from global academic and policy discourses is evident from the
language with which they are expressed. The poverty line or level, 'basic needs' and nutritional status were
definitions and measurements used in 40% of responses (see Table 2). Although the success of local NGOs and
micro-credit institutions such as the Grameen Bank have probably meant a two-way traffic between Bangladesh
and the outside world in ideas and language of poverty, the penetration of the donor language of development
is prominent. One business leader spoke of 'a two-pronged attack on poverty'4, the need for 'an enabling
environment' to be provided by government and PPP (purchasing power parity). He then proceeded to give an
assessment of the Grameen Bank, its institutional status, and its effectiveness as a programme for alleviating
9poverty. Others not involved in development work displayed equal familiarity with 'technical' debates, and some
cited specific World Bank and UN organisation reports to support their arguments. The elite English language
newspapers frequently carry lengthy features detailing development projects, with several columnists'
contributions devoted entirely to such issues. The language of 'human resource development' (universal primary
education, non-formal education) is also conspicuous, and the concept of 'gender dimensions of poverty' has
certainly filtered through to the elite, although this may be most evident at the level of language (the 'double
burden on women', 'intra-household distribution', etc). Language seems important, however: the extent to which
poverty alleviation and development ideas use English-language terms is striking – suggesting strongly that
many of the concepts in use have no Bengali equivalents in common use5. A clear example of this is the term
'development' itself: usually translated into Bangla as unnayan, it has been claimed that this was a Sanskritised
term, reinvented to capture (imported) ideas of economic development and modernisation (UBINIG 1995).
Unnoti, the term for development apparently more commonly used by the Bangladeshi poor, has more local
connotations of self-reliance and social uplift (Farida Akhter, personal communication).
Ideas about national poverty also contribute to the content of Bangladeshi national identity. The contrast
between the present-day international image of Bangladesh and the mythical Sonar Bangla (Golden Bengal) is
repeatedly raised by elites to highlight the gap between party political rhetoric and reality. The myth of Bengali
agrarian prosperity and abundance may bear slight relation to historical accounts of calamities and exploitation
(Greenough 1985). It has, however, been an important construct for Bangladeshi national identity, carrying an
implicit political agenda based around the removal of exploitative Pakistani colonialism and in particular,
providing 'the dream which fuelled the imagination of those who struggled for a free and independent
Bangladesh' (Guhathakurta 1997:1). Many members of the elite now view the idea of Sonar Bangla as little more
than a political catch-phrase, and are far more attuned to the international image of Bangladesh. Although they
resist one-dimensional representations of Bangladesh as 'only poor', the elite are themselves fully aware of the
prevalence of poverty in Bangladesh, with 71% putting the proportion of the poor at over 50%, against only 4%
claiming it to be less than 50% (see Table 2). That is, the idea that Bangladesh is one of the poorest nations in
the world has been accepted, and representations of Bangladesh as such are considered to be unnecessarily
biased and unfair, but not inaccurate.
Table 2 :   The proportion of  the poor among the population of  Bangladesh
Responses Number of responses
Statistics are unhelpful 4 (5%)
No clear answer 11 (14%)
Large proportion 5 (6%)
Less than 25% 2 (3%)
25-49% 1 (1%)
50-74% 31 (39%)
75-99% 25 (32%)
All 79 (100%)
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The recognition that Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries in the world raises interesting contrasts with
elites in other contexts, particularly where poverty was perceived as threatening the wealth or international
stature of the nation. The prevalence of poverty in rich countries has been viewed variously as a drain on
national wealth, an obstacle to national productivity (Innes 1996), or as a national security threat (for example,
English concerns about the 'state of the race' during the Boer War (Himmelfarb 1991; Rosenthal 1986). Can
such concerns have any resonance for the Bangladeshi elite?  Perhaps not, given that in this context 'poverty' is
not only about poor people, but is a concept with application to the country as a whole. Comparison with elite
perceptions in other poor countries may help us to better understand whether or not poverty in poor countries
can be seen as a significant national security or efficiency threat. In addition, as is suggested in section 7.2, the
elite have a weak sense of interdependence with the poor. Perhaps, also, it is important to keep in mind the
point made by Toye (1997): that anti-poverty programmes in developing countries have tended not to emerge
from national concerns and agendas, but from those of the international organisations. It is plausible that
Bangladeshi elites have a weaker sense of poverty policy 'ownership' than they have of 'owning' broader
development policy agendas, in which they have more of a stake.
5.2   Promoting Productivity
Most respondents gave a range of solutions to poverty ranging from indirect and general (political
accountability, the promotion of nationalistic feeling) to directly productivity-enhancing (micro-credit,
employment creation). Education dominated, however, as the single best direct means of reducing poverty, and
was rarely rejected as a solution. This faith in education draws on an understanding that education promotes
'awareness' or 'consciousness', the lack of which is a major cause of overpopulation, poor health practices,
fatalism, and the 'inability to think beyond tomorrow' ascribed to poor people. Education is the first step, to
many respondents, because without it, the poor cannot make use of the opportunities available to them. It is
thus a fairly simple solution to a wide range of poverty-related problems.
The stress on education is also at times explicitly based on models of development drawn from other Asian
countries, in particular the East and Southeast Asian 'tiger economies', as well as Sri Lanka and Kerala. It is
significant that what were at times detailed explanations of how these models could be applied in the
Bangladesh context omitted mention of land reform and redistribution, although agricultural investment was
raised. The lessons drawn from these Asian models may be summarised as high literacy levels having the
potential to transform the burdens of large, intelligent populations into assets:
(The national priority is) to turn a burden into wealth. Population just by itself is a burden, but a
trained population is wealth. And given the needs of the information age, the 21st century
technology revolution and all that, education, human resource development, skills training is really
the only answer (Editor, English daily newspaper).
It is significant that Western countries with their welfare states were excluded from this discussion on national
poverty. One member of the social elite claimed that
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Ultimately it is government (which is responsible for poverty). I am not advocating a welfare state
though, that didn't work. What has to be done is to create an environment which allows people to
develop themselves.
The welfare state model has almost no relevance for the Bangladeshi elite. Even where the language of direct
provision and safety nets is used, it is about promoting, not protecting, the capabilities of the poor:
Economic growth has never taken care of poverty anyway. Particularly with a massive poor
population like in Bangladesh. We'll have to have a safety-net, definitely.
In what sense a safety-net?
Well for example, government will always need to invest a lot of money in skills training and
human resource development. And this human resource development programme will have to be
a government programme, massive government investment. Private sector will not be interested in
coming in in a big way. So economic growth will pull the country upwards, but for the bottom, for
the 45% of the population to jump onto that wagon of growth, there will have to be a push up
from the bottom. Which means human resource development, training, a massive investment in
education. And micro-credit. Micro-credit is that push from the bottom - you can picture this as a
huge rocket going up towards the sky and people are not being able to reach it, and you give it a
push from the bottom, and then they will reach it (Newspaper editor).
The imagery used here is instructive. Removing poverty is about increasing productivity, and this frame
excludes any options as short-term, crude or immediate as handing over resources to the poor. The passage
above implies that Bangladesh will not (should not) attempt to emulate older Western models of development.
Although the scale of the poor population will require an extra 'push', interventions designed to increase
productivity, such as micro-credit, will (should) take the place of welfarism. A government minister spoke
similarly of Bangladesh being in the 'pre take-off stage'. This dynamism contrasts sharply with the image of
handouts: 'government', it was asserted, 'cannot feed everyone'. The announcement of pensions for the rural
elderly received mixed reviews - praised in some quarters as evidence of the Prime Minister's personal concern
for the poor, it was derided in others as tokenistic and for political patronage6. An attempt to unearth explicitly
moral distinctions between 'deserving' and 'undeserving' groups revealed that these distinctions were considered
less salient criteria than that of 'productive potential'. Most responses which ranked groups on the priorities for
income assistance selected 'productive' groups (marginal farmers, landless labourers, rickshaw-pullers) over
'unproductive' groups (widows and other female household heads, the disabled, the elderly, prostitutes, beggars,
children, etc.). One respondent said that although it seemed callous, this was a pragmatic response, as these
groups could contribute to the economy.
This reluctance to discuss state-sponsored social security was not matched by universal faith in economic
growth alone as a solution to poverty, with a third of respondents stressing that growth was necessary but not
sufficient (see Table 3). A somewhat vaguely conceived notion of pro-poor growth seemed to inform this
'necessary but not sufficient' view of the contribution of economic growth.
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Table 3 :   Wil l  economic growth solve the poverty problem in t ime?
Responses Number of responses
Yes 23 33%
Necessary but not sufficient/
potentially
23 33%
Ambivalent 2 3%
No 13 19%
Other 9 13%
Total 70 100%
Framing poverty alleviation as exclusively about the promotion rather than the protection of livelihoods meant
it proved difficult to direct discussions towards forms of social assistance not seen as directly enhancing
productivity. Even where the terms of the discussion emphasised 'safety nets' and direct provision for the poor,
it became clear that the most direct intervention which would be countenanced was skills training, as in the
editor's views cited above. Where mentioned, ideas about state social security were rejected in favour of the
provision of 'enabling environments'. The key enabler is education, which appeared as the solution to a wide
range of ills: fatalism and laziness, high fertility, a lack of 'consciousness' or 'awareness' of the causes of poverty
on the part of the poor, the inability of the poor to plan or manage their incomes and so on. Significantly, apart
from education, few direct interventions for specific groups of the vulnerable poor were mentioned. Meaningful
distinctions drawn between poverty and absolute poverty were rare. There were slight indications that some
groups of the poor, e.g., the disabled, may be entitled to welfare provision, but on probing it became clear once
again that this should take the form of enabling them to work through the provision of skills training. Women-
headed households were also mentioned on occasion, but without reference to income transfers or safety nets:
education and training, and micro-credit were the preferred solutions for these groups. Models of gender
relations – specifically a belief among male elites that widows and other single women are assisted by their
communities - clearly influence this position (see below). But the important point for our purposes is that a
frame which keeps productivity in tight focus excludes groups of the poor whom education, training and even
micro-credit are unlikely to help in the short term. The remarkable entrepreneurship displayed by poor
Bangladeshi women, in particular, may strengthen the focus on productivity, at the expense of one on
vulnerability.
Contrasts with Victorian elite perceptions of poverty illustrate this point. Himmelfarb (1991) documents
how the public (elite) imagination at the end of the 19th century became dominated by perceptions of the
'respectable' labouring poor as vulnerable - who despite seeking their independence, were liable to sink into the
ranks of the paupers or 'undeserving' poor. An emphasis on the vulnerability of the livelihoods of the -
productive or otherwise - poor, perhaps even more crucial in the Bangladesh context, seems to be excluded by
emphases on the homogeneity of the poor (see below) and on productivity. In addition, this stress entirely
excludes recognition that the experience of poverty may be marked by life stages during which productivity is
not a consideration.
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Perceptions of successes and failures in social policy clearly inform elite conceptualisations of the problem
(see Smith 1997: 998). Recent rises in primary enrolment rates may have encouraged the elite to see a solution
to poverty within education. This was one area where our respondents gave their government both credit and
responsibility7. Similarly, a record of local success makes micro-credit another popular solution, and also one
which appears to fit it in with the idea of safety nets as essentially about productivity. In sum, tried and tested
solutions to low productivity enacted mainly by the government and the NGOs are favoured forms of public
policy, but the links between problems and solutions are often poorly comprehended. Public discussion of
'national poverty' strategies seems to be rooted in these successes, but the appearance of consensus among the
elite may mask a lack of clarity in thinking about the problems.
5.3  Poverty Alleviation = Development
This lack of clarity can be explained in part by the fusing of discussions about poverty alleviation with debates
about 'development' generally. As suggested above, the idea of national poverty has symbolic significance as
part of national identity, and reference to national poverty often evokes a sense of national dysfunction more
generally. What this means is that the elite, while fully aware of the image of Bangladesh as extremely poor, are
themselves attuned to other problems are of more immediate concern to themselves, and as they perceive it, to
the long-term future of the country. A link between poverty narrowly defined and development more broadly is
justifiably drawn, and the elite shift easily into discussions of development as a result. Poverty is by no means a
discrete issue, and solutions espoused as poverty reducing may in fact take their primary justification from an
altogether different objective.
Given the broad significance of the idea of national poverty and the extent of poverty in Bangladesh, it is
no surprise that discussions about poverty overlapped considerably with discussions of national priorities (see
Table 4). This is not a radical finding, nor are the elite wrong to view poverty alleviation as part of a broader
development project. This does, however, seem important when viewed from the angle of the political
possibilities for anti-poverty interventions. Can poverty become a high priority when it is conceptually
inseparable from a host of other high priorities?
Most individual interviewees gave separate, different responses to the questions about national priorities
and the causes of poverty, although a handful claimed these were identical issues. The overlap between the two
categories may therefore suggest an element of arbitrariness as to whether the problem fell into the category of
'national priorities', or of the 'causes of poverty'.
The most obvious explanation for this overlap between the perceived causes of poverty and the national
priorities for government to tackle is that the elite believe that the causes of poverty, and therefore poverty
itself, is (or should be) the national government's priority, and that these are, therefore, the same issues. At one
level it would seem to be true that 'poverty' is a priority problem, according to the elite. However, the term
'poverty' often seems to symbolise far more than simply a large proportion of people below the poverty line: it
at times evokes an entire nexus of ideas about the obstacles to development. These include natural disasters,
historical legacies of colonisation, poor governance, religious orthodoxy, 'backwardness' and overpopulation.
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Prioritising 'poverty', therefore, is at one level indistinct from prioritising 'development'. Few people in
Bangladesh will argue that 'development' is not a priority.
Table 4 :   Eli te perceptions of  national  priorit ies and the causes of  poverty
Responses National priorities
(number of times the
response was given)
Causes of poverty
(number of times the
response was given)
Motivational factors among the poor themselves
(awareness, religious orthodoxy, fatalism)
7 (4%) 16 (9%)
Education/skills/human resources 39 (22%) 34 (19%)
Political factors 22 (13%) 23 (13%)
Economic management 42 (24%) 47 (26%)
Structural inequalities in access to resources,
including 'poverty'
30 (17%) 24 (13%)
Overpopulation and pressure on the land 14 (8%) 22 (12%)
Natural disasters, land erosion 3 (2%) 6 (3%)
Women's rights 2 (1%) 0 (0%)
Law & order 17 (10%) 0 (0%)
Donor dependence, colonialism 0 (0%) 10 (6%)
Total 176 (100%) 182 (100%)
Some members of the Bangladeshi elite would, however, contest the model of development being pursued:
The general Bangladesh economy itself is very dependent in many ways, the whole type of
production and growth, the whole industrial and commercial sector has not been of the type of
growth that one needs …  When you're trying to develop an economy, that should not be within a
system which is going to exacerbate poverty, keep the country in future insecurity – see what
happened in Southeast Asia (NGO Leader).
Such challenges to the dominant discourse come mainly from a section of the NGO leadership, intellectuals and
politicians from the left. 'Structures', the need to change 'social relations of production' through land reform,
and criticisms of service-providing NGOs tended to feature in these discussions. Interestingly, however, some
accounts combined radical critiques with references to traditional elite responsibilities and rural social systems.
The dominant models of development are understood to exacerbate poverty, as in this account of why
discussions of 'safety nets' are inherently flawed:
Why design a system that people fall out of in the first place?  Isn't that the point?  That is
unacceptable, just accepting the negative outcomes of development, justifying developmental
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activities. What needs to be done is to strengthen the community, so that they can support their
own (NGO/Advocacy group leader).
A poverty focus is itself constructed as problematic, as it fosters dependence and does not promote the
capabilities of the people. NGOs are criticised as having 'capitalised on the poverty issues', and perhaps in
reaction to such criticism, some NGO leaders stressed that their organisational focus was empowerment, rather
than poverty reduction through service provision.
Similar debates are well developed within NGO and academic circles and while they find faint echoes
among other members of the elite, seem to be increasingly marginalised. A strong emphasis on poverty is within
these perspectives considered suspect for a number of excellent reasons: it downplays the issue of power; it is to
an extent an imported perspective on the problems of Bangladesh, with imported solutions; and it belies the
capability and agency of the poor themselves. Even more marginalised within these challenges is a belief in
traditional support systems, and a corresponding suspicion of state involvement in supporting the poor. Despite
their position as challengers, these views support the dominant discourse by downplaying the centrality of
poverty. Suspicion of the state's motives means that the dominant position of ambivalence towards direct public
action often seems to go unchallenged.
6   THE CHARITABLE IDIOM OF POVERTY
The second idiom within which the elite spoke about poverty was personal and charitable. The implicit focus
was not so much 'national poverty' as 'traditional' elite responsibility for individuals and groups of poor people.
Most respondents seemed confident talking about poverty in this way, and spoke more concretely about what
poverty meant and how it should be alleviated. Many interviews featured detailed descriptions and anecdotal
evidence about the nature of poor people, based on actual encounters and relationships, so that discussions
drew less on a form of practical knowledge of poor people rather than an imagined poor population of huge
proportions. Three issues are introduced in this section: how this responsibility is conceptualised and captured
in language; perceptions of the nature of poor people; and the mediation of practical knowledge of the poor by
understandings of Bengali Muslim tradition. The section concludes with a discussion of an area in which the
developmental and the charitable idioms converge.
6.1  'Traditional'  Responsibilit ies for the Poor
Themes of private, personalised provision for narrow welfare communities were present in many discussions.
Public discourses of responsibility, as suggested above, were important in unearthing an arena of discussion that
the idiom of national poverty failed to bring out. Table 5 suggests that there is some ambivalence about the role
of the state. It should be noted that even when 'government alone' was allocated ultimate responsibility for
poverty, this was usually seen as the responsibility to provide enabling environments, and not to direct resources
towards the poor. In part, the elite explain this emphasis on non-state responsibility with reference to notions of
Bengali Muslim tradition, with a focus on personalised, voluntary provision for 'one's own people'.
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Examples of how the elite could have an impact on poverty by helping out 'their people' were frequent,
and took many forms. The wife of an industrialist, head of a charity herself, considered her husband's strategy
of recruiting factory employees from 'his village' to be an excellent example of the principle that 'charity begins
at home'. A former government Secretary and university Vice-Chancellor detailed proposals from English
language newspapers on his idea of 'Micro-credit from Micro-sources' – that all rich people should set up
personal micro-credit schemes in their home villages, to be personally overseen, and to involve personal vetting
of suitably able but poor people. These proposals received widespread praise.
Table 5 :   Who is  ult imately responsible for poverty al leviation?
National Regional Non-state State All
Government alone 20 38% 0 0% 13 30% 7 35% 20 31%
Government & others
(NGOs, individuals,
society)
23 43% 10 91% 22 50% 11 55% 33 52%
Others (NGOs,
individuals, society)
10 19% 1 9% 9 20% 2 10% 11 17%
Total 53 100% 11 100% 44 100% 20 100% 64 100%
The strength of the charitable impulse for one's own community is not restricted to the elite's private dealings
with the poor; Members of Parliament also couch their responsibilities towards constituents in this idiom of
personal responsibility:
I'm not a very rich woman ... my responsibilities to my constituents and also to my people - I
cannot provide for or meet all of their needs, and all that they ask for. In that sense, I am also
lacking in money, because I cannot afford to give them everything they want. You see I am trying
in my most humble way, with whatever I can from my own resources give them. Sometimes I do
work for them, I give them.
Other politicians talk of 'their' villages, and indicate that their political duties are conceived of as very much
about bringing resources to their 'home' districts. MPs not directly involved in poverty alleviation or
development programmes spoke almost exclusively in this idiom of personal charity, and rarely mentioned their
role as national policy makers. Women were most likely to draw on their experiences of dealing with domestic
servants, and to assert that their practices of helping their servants, particularly through educating their children
and supporting them in times of crisis, was a valid means of alleviating poverty:
Privately, we do a lot, hospital foundations, donations, but how much can you cover?  We start
from our house, with our servants. They are very poor, we educate their children, assist them first.
If every house had to do this, it would be so much better (Businesswoman).
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Exceptions exist, but observations of how domestic servants are generally treated within rich households reveal
a far less rosy picture8. The elite's relationships with their servants reveal vestiges of rural dependency
relationships transferred to the urban setting, with many household servants brought from householder's home
villages, and in firmly non-contractual relationships with their 'employers'. These relationships are important
because they are some of the closest relationships the elite have with poor people.
Personal experience of assisting the poor appears to prove its value to the elite. A former civil servant
recounted a story about a poor man who had been trying to migrate to Dhaka for a job, but had been cheated
out of the job and his savings. Our interviewee gave this man the money to get himself back to his village, the
moral of the story being that 'if we had more social responsibility like that, then it would be alright'. When asked
to make comparisons between two incidents that occurred during the interview process, involving deaths from
illicit alcohol and from cold weather, the responses repeatedly highlighted the desirability of personal provision.
Deaths from illicit alcohol were usually deemed to be the fault of the law enforcement agencies, and therefore
the responsibility of the state to prevent. The deaths from cold weather, by contrast, were understood as an act
of God, and rich society was held jointly responsible with government for helping the victims:
Death from cold happens every year. Poor people live from hand to mouth, sleep in the street
under the open sky, how can they afford warm clothes?  Government alone is not responsible, we
who live in the five-storied buildings should deliver old warm clothes to them ... In the case of
alcohol deaths I think the likelihood of such an incident remained in the knowledge of the police
as they allowed that illicit trade. I don't accuse the total government, rather the concerned law and
order restoration authority neglected their authority. This is preventable by strict enforcement of
chain of order and sincerity. Death from cold is really painful. There should be distinctive
government plans for preventing such an inhuman incident each year. We noticed various
organisations, parties, government, individuals distributed warm clothes when they got informed
of these deaths through the newspapers. This help was great for the cold-stricken poor people
(Religious leader).
When talking publicly about poverty within this idiom, the emphasis is firmly on the responsibility of the elite to
assist the poor, rather than on the outcomes of that assistance. An illustration of this emphasis is in the response
to the cold weather in January of 1998. The elite media, at least, appeared to consider the names of those who
had made donations to the Prime Minister's Relief Fund more newsworthy than the actual suffering9.
Questioned on the impact of these well-publicised acts of charity, the elite praised the response, and generally
considered it adequate. There were no suggestions from our respondents that the government could have co-
ordinated a more comprehensive relief effort. The two such demands for co-ordinated state action made in the
newspaper editorials reviewed were counter-balanced by calls on the 'affluent people of society to come in aid
of the distressed specially those who are suffering from severe cold' made by representatives of government
(The Daily Star and The Independent 24 January 1998).
The sense that the elite held personal social and moral responsibility for groups of the poor, particularly
those from their home villages/districts, was pronounced. The failure of members of the elite, particularly the
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'nouveau riche', to fulfil this responsibility towards the poor was more severely and frequently condemned than
the failure of successive governments to make inroads into poverty. Phrases such as 'elite failure', and the lack
of a 'moral elite' were used; philanthropy was generally deemed to be a dying cause, and the 'new elite' were
generally singled out for these failures. These themes take their meaning very largely from a particular reading of
Bengali tradition, in which zamindars made direct provision for 'their' poor, particularly in times of crisis, and
also built schools and hospitals. Elite women, in particular, are expected to continue this tradition:
The tradition of charitable work in which I am involved has always been with moneyed people
here - not all moneyed people all of the time, but some. I can keep giving, myself, starting with my
servants and their families - we always take care of the whole family, and people generally do help
their servants. But very few people go out to the slums, and help those in the slums.
Why do some wealthy people help the poor and not others?
It is a social problem - those who feel for the country do help. Some people spend thousands of
dollars going to Hajj and all that, but never think of opening a school. Look at my father-in-law,
who helps his entire village. My husband's company is full of people from the village - they always
get first priority with jobs. We are always looking after the village - after all, charity begins at
home.
Is a solution to the problem of poverty more philanthropy?
I think so. But things are changing. When I used to live in my parents' house, there were always
some poor old women, widows and people who used to eat at each of the family's houses every
day. They would come in and have their rice, and maybe do some work. These were genuine
beggars. But nowadays the beggars are all professionals who have the help of the authorities, with
the police taking a percentage of their earnings. One shouldn't give money to professional beggars
at all.
The effects of the private charitable activities of elite women on public anti-poverty policy have been the subject
of much historical study (Himmelfarb 1991; Lewis 1996; Skocpol 1992). Many references to the philanthropic
tradition of Bengal were idealistic, and spoke in favour of close personal ties in structuring poverty alleviation
efforts. Others were less idealistic, focusing on the benefits to the elite from helping the poor:
Where we talked about elites in Bangladesh it has historically been in the context of feudal
Bangladesh, where the feudal lords were preserving the poor people for the taxation, if not this
year, then next year. Now the elites in Bangladesh are not really feudal, but more mercantile,
bureaucratic, political people, who do not have the same kind of necessity as the feudal lords had
to do. So they would be less likely than the feudal lords to look after the problems of the poor or
anything like that. The elites are now as much dependent on the poor as much as it impinges on
their conscience. That when I am eating well and going to sleep it would feel better if everyone
else was doing the same than if everyone else is not doing the same (Businessman).
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Still others pointed out that the weakness of ties between an increasingly urban elite and the rural poor were
making this tradition die:
It was an old Bengal tradition, a subcontinental tradition, helping the poor stand on their own feet.
Is this tradition dying out?
We're not in the villages any more, the gulf between us and the rural people is becoming much
much wider. Formerly you would see that on the Eid day, almost everyone would rush to the
villages, but now it's only those of the lower economic strata, those who have links to the rural
areas, those who still get their share of crops of rice.
Some members of the elite were aware that the tradition of zamindari philanthropy had few Bengali Muslim
representatives, as zamindars were mainly Hindu. However, Islam also provides clear guidelines about provision
for the poor, and religious obligations such as zakat (Islamic tax on wealth) and feeding the poor at Eid festivals
were frequently invoked. On occasion this gave rise to contradictory positions: while very little support was
given to the idea that taxes should be raised for more poverty alleviation programmes, mostly on the basis that
taxes are not collected (see Table 8), it was frequently suggested that zakat collection could be institutionalised
to provide for the poor10. It seems plausible that the elite believe that such funds were less likely to be
misappropriated, but also that fulfilling religious obligations towards the poor was more likely to appeal to the
elite than state tax collections. In nineteenth and early twentieth century France, Catholic as well as liberal elites
opposed to institutionalising the 'right to assistance' made precisely these claims: state assistance programmes, it
was successfully argued for many decades, threatened 'both the spontaneity and the interpersonal character of
the act of giving' (Smith 1997: 1002). Notions of the virtues of charity, it seems, contribute to a reluctance to
allow the state to appropriate this role as providers for the poor. The positive appraisal of NGOs, on the one
hand, and the discussion of their shortcomings, on the other, also has clear links with the perceptions of
traditional charity. These issues will be discussed below.
6.2  The Deserving and Undifferentiated Poor
One implication of the emphasis on charity is that the poor should be deserving. Fortunately for the proponents
of charity, there appear to be few models of the undeserving or dangerous poor, other than professional
beggars, who are not believed to be 'genuinely poor'. This was matched by a reluctance to differentiate among
groups of the poor. When asked to categorise the poor, or to prioritise them in order of need, the elite were
resistant, often on moral grounds. This resistance seems to emanate in part from the desire to represent
Bangladesh as ethnically homogenous, and in part from an emphasis on the lack of caste or strict class divisions
in Bangladeshi society. For whatever reasons, the poor were generally perceived as universally deserving. This
point is more important than it might seem. In other contexts, e.g., the nineteenth century English Poor Laws,
the poor were categorised as 'deserving' and 'undeserving', and allocated direct assistance and punitive measures
accordingly (Squires 1990: 94). Changes in elite perceptions of types of poor people have frequently prompted
radical welfare reforms and extensions (Himmelfarb 1991).
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It could be argued that the Bangladeshi elite do have implicit categories of the poor for assistance,
according to whether or not they are 'their' moral community (from their home district, or an employee, etc.).
But the genuine poor are universally constructed as unthreatening and generally honest people, struggling for
simple respectability. As will be seen below, the poor are not considered to be a threat to the elite, and this is
attributed to their inherently moral nature:
I do not connect (the law and order situation) with poverty, because the majority of the poor
people are law-abiding …  you cannot generalise that we have many poor people so the law and
order situation is deteriorating. No, there is no such connection. The poor people would like to
have an honest living. These people who migrate from rural areas, they take to rickshaw-pulling,
hawking, domestic service and all kinds of jobs. They are used to having a respectable living with
hard physical labour. When they fail to do that, they will start begging (Government Secretary).
The argument above against a connection between poverty and crime is on the basis that the poor are essentially
'honest', seeking a 'respectable living with hard physical labour'. The contrast between this perception of the
poor and that of the elite in early twentieth century Uttar Pradesh is instructive. In Uttar Pradesh 'the shudra
poor were the objects both of scorn and suspicion of their social superiors and they were seen as virtual
outcasts and as a lowly, volatile, riffraff, floating, rootless population' (Gooptu 1997: 888). In the UP case, the
poor became the object of resettlement programmes designed to remove them from town centres and side-step
the public health threat they were expected to pose. Beier highlights the importance of a 'literature of roguery' –
popular accounts of the underworld of beggars and tramps – in developing the elite pressure for state action on
poverty in fifteenth and sixteenth century England (1983: 16). By contrast, the poor traditionally appeared in
classical Bengali literature within themes of pastoral beauty and rural idylls, although replaced more recently
against a backdrop of rural crisis by motifs of dispossession and peasant resistance (Beck and Bose 1995). This
literature has rarely failed, however, to represent the poor sympathetically, whichever political position was
taken. There seem to be few indigenous models of the undeserving poor for the Bangladeshi elite to draw upon.
Although categories based on whether or not the poor are deserving are largely absent, descriptions of the
poor sometimes revealed normative judgements which the elite did not seem to consider moral distinctions.
After lengthy discussions, in some cases, concepts like the 'gendered dimensions of poverty' and 'intra-
household distribution' began to slip away to reveal that for male elites, at least, the operational model of 'poor
person' was that of a poor man with dependants. One male MP explicitly stated that
Women are not independent, they are part of the main. Because they are somebody's wife and
somebody's mother. Poverty does not differentiate between male and female, it has to be a family.
There is no male and female poverty, there is just poverty for the people of this country. And a
female is part of a family, as a wife as a mother as a grandmother.
That poor people are generally understood by male elites to be male householders was also made clear in the
instance described above, where small farmers, landless labourers and rickshaw-pullers, explicitly treated by
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respondents as male categories, were selected as targets for income assistance, on the grounds that they were
productive.
6.3  A 'Social Movement' against Poverty
One theme in which the issues of national poverty and personal responsibility seemed to converge was in
discussions of the nature of the national effort required to alleviate poverty. Many members of the elite argued
that a broad 'social movement' was required to tackle the problem (see Table 5), with three basic features. The
first was that this was not a matter for conflictual class politics, nor for democratic political competition.
Collective action was required, but not necessarily on the part of the poor. What was required was individual
commitment, particularly of elites. In some accounts, present politicians' lack of commitment to reducing
poverty was attributed to the lack of 'nationalistic feeling' or 'feeling for the country' on the part of elites
generally. 'Doing politics with the plight of the people' was one frequent assessment of political competition
over poverty. This view partly reflects a perception that anti-poverty policies are overridden with each in-coming
government, but also a belief that the elite are not genuinely committed to poverty alleviation, or national
development generally:
The most important (cause of poverty) is that we are not nationalistic, we don't have any feeling
for the country, we are very selfish.
Who are 'we'?
Selfish people, those who are in power. The people who do politics. Political persons are not
doing politics for the country's sake (Jatiya Party MP).
The category of 'political factors' in Table 5 contains a large proportion of claims about a lack of commitment
to poverty alleviation, and the use of poverty as a political football between parties. There is a strong sense
among the elite - and this includes many of the political elite - that poverty is an issue which rises (or should
rise) above the realm of democratic party political competition. Reasons for such a united social front include
that 'you can't expect the government to do everything' or that 'government alone cannot cope with such a vast
problem', and at times draw on neo-liberal ideas about the desirability of downsizing the state.
The second feature of this 'social movement' was that its contents and the mechanisms by which it might
work to reduce poverty are unclear. Some suggestions were that the media could be used to channel information
which would 'motivate people into a social movement against poverty'. But the stress on social unity is itself
significant, given the historic importance of ethnic divisions in Bengali/Bangladeshi nationalism (Mohsin 1996).
The association of ethnicity and/or religion with class in political conflicts has historically been strong in the
region, perhaps even to the extent that the elite fail to identify the potential for political divisions which are not
communal in nature. The language of a unified moral community 'against' poverty appears to derive in part
from the emphasis on social action against poverty within Islam, and on the idea of Umma, which denotes an
undivided community. This idea of a social movement also clearly takes some inspiration from perceptions of
the liberation struggle, in which rich and poor pulled together successfully to overcome another national evil11.
As Hashemi (1996) reminds us, Bangladesh has a rich tradition of 'civil society', often overlooked by outsiders
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in the current enthusiasm over NGOs. The elite appear to draw on this tradition in thinking about the
responsibility for action against poverty.
Thirdly, this 'social movement' does not amount to a civil society movement to demand action from the
state. Within this social movement it is not 'the poor' who are expected to push collectively for anti-poverty
action, but 'all of society', 'everyone', or the 'educated, conscious people'. Leaders of NGOs involved in service
provision concurred more with ideas that action against poverty should be social rather than party political or
class-based. NGO leaders and activists involved in 'demand-building' or consciousness-raising emphasised their
role in building poor people's capacities to make demands on the government, i.e., political action. These
differences within the elite NGO community reflect broader internal debates over the proper roles of NGOs
(Lewis et al, 1994). Intellectuals were also more likely to emphasise that poverty alleviation was by its nature
political, and tended to assign responsibility to the state, rather than society as a whole. A well-developed
critique has emerged on the role of the service-providing NGOs as a result of these differences.
In sum, poverty reduction is viewed as ideally a moral issue for society, and above the realm of politics, a
position strengthened by neo-liberal views of state action. Party political competition is disallowed as a
motivation for poverty alleviation: the elite instead hope for stronger personal commitment to reducing poverty,
with morality as the motivation. It is interesting that within these discussions a number of interviewees
questioned the value of democracy itself, and appeared to regard it as an unfavourable condition for poverty
alleviation. The preference for apolitical approaches to poverty alleviation has clear links with the ambivalence
towards state responsibility for poverty discussed above.
7   THE LACK OF URGENCY
Neither of the idioms employed by the Bangladeshi elite in talking about poverty contribute to a sense of
urgency. While very different in their intellectual and linguistic origins, these idioms converge on a key debate:
that the state should limit its direct provision for the poor. This is based less on a sense that direct provision will
breed dependency than that resources could be better spent in enhancing the productivity of the poor. A frame
of productivity and, implicitly, of pro-poor growth, delimits the discussion so that neither redistribution nor
income transfers (nor safety nets) can feature. The importance given to education in these debates does,
however, suggest that the elite would support specific forms of social policy which would favour the poor in the
longer-term, although assistance for the poorest of the poor may remain excluded within these terms. That
poverty is viewed as neither an issue requiring immediate, short-term attention, nor as one requiring urgent state
action, suggests that the elite do not assign it a high priority. It will be argued below that the lack of a sense of
threat from poverty is one explanation for the lack of urgency assigned to poverty reduction.
7.1  The Lack of a Significant Threat from Poverty
As mentioned above, in other, well-documented cases direct public action has been taken against poverty in part
as a result of threats from poverty perceived by the elite (Beier 1983; De Swaan 1988). In such cases the 'spectre
of the crowd' increased the urgency of tackling poverty. Poverty seems to lack this urgency for the Bangladeshi
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elite, partly because, it will be argued below, they do not perceive the poor to pose a significant threat to their
welfare.
The threat of poverty leading to social unrest - so prominent in the minds of 19th century western elites -
was barely mentioned by the Bangladeshi elite, and then only in passing. There was very clearly no potential for
insurrection by the poor, but instead a far weaker notion that the current situation may not be sustained
indefinitely. One businessman claimed that revolution was simply 'not possible in the current world context'. A
prominent NGO leader suggested that the Bangladeshi elite were not directly concerned about poverty, except
to the extent that it might in the future impact negatively on their prospects:
I don't think they are worried about the poverty issue, but I think that most elites in Bangladesh
are probably worried about the future of Bangladesh, whether elites' lives will be affected directly
by this grinding poverty, the breakdown of law and order, whether there will be any jobs for their
children, when they come back from the United States after getting their MA. That kind of thing.
Is there a future for the elite?  That kind of thing.
Mechanisms that could trigger dissatisfaction and unrest among the poor were seldom mentioned. An
industrialist suggested that the aspirations of the poor were being raised through access to information about
other lifestyles through the global media and returnee migrant workers. Another comment was that poor
people's perceptions of the widening gap between the rich and themselves were encouraging aggressive
behaviour towards the elite. Specific mechanisms and perceptions of dissatisfaction like these were isolated
views, however, and did not represent the bulk of opinion.
A study of elite attitudes in Brazil found that the elite were similarly unconcerned about social unrest and
the threat of revolution, but that they did, on the other hand, consider 'private' urban violence, crime, and the
lack of safety to be a result of urban poverty (Reis and Cheibub 1994). South African elites also made a clear
connection between the prevalence of poverty and crime, and were concerned about its impact on their own
welfare; however, they tended to view the crimes of the poor as relatively petty (Manor and Kalati,
forthcoming). In the Bangladesh case, the elite clearly feel that Dhaka city is under pressure from apparently
rapid urban population growth and spiralling crime rates, but they perceive a weak link between crime and
poverty. Once we recognised that urban migration was a major concern, we probed for possible perceptual links
between migration of the rural poor and rising crime. But poor rural migrants and poverty more generally were
not seen to be at the root of the problem (see Table 6), and our national elite respondents, in particular,
repeatedly rubbished the idea of a link between crime and poverty. Poor people were rarely seen as the
instigators of criminal activity, although they may in specific instances have been sucked in by other, non-poor
gangsters. As in the South African case, the petty crimes of the sort associated with poverty were thought to
affect the elite very marginally. Organised crime associated with political party youth wings was considered to
be a greater problem, but the perpetrators were understood to be 'students', 'the drug addicts of the middle
classes or rich men's sons', and even members of the police force themselves - in sum, not the poor. The
Bangladeshi elite tend to frame concerns about crime in terms of inadequate law enforcement, but also to view
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the law enforcement agencies as part of the problem. The issue of poor people committing crimes was decidedly
sidelined in these discussions, and is evidently not a concern for the elite.
Table 6 :   Is urban migration of the poor l inked to the rising crime rate?
Responses given Number of each
response given
No 28 (43%)
The poor are not the main perpetrators 6 (9%)
Yes, but crimes are not committed against the elite 2 (3%)
Yes 17 (26%)
No clear answer 12 (18%)
Total 65 (100%)
Urban migration was a concern mainly because it entailed pressure on weak public services, traffic congestion,
and general disorder. One suggestion was that improving rural employment prospects would reduce the need
for migration and hence relieve some of the pressure on urban services. Other comments, however, revealed
that the richer sections of the elite were not entirely dependent on public utilities, and that therefore, this sort of
pressure affected them relatively little. The issue of declining urban services was linked more closely to poor
urban planning on the part of the municipal corporation than to the presence of the poor. The visible signs of
poverty resulting from urban overcrowding - bustees (slums) and beggars - were widely considered unattractive,
but not dangerous to the elite. Health problems and the unsanitary conditions of the poor were similarly more a
matter of distaste than of concern. Ill-health and uncleanliness were frequently seen as functions of the lack of
knowledge, education and awareness, rather than of poverty as such. In other urban settings, the elite have
indicated that the presence of the poor was a public health risk to themselves by having the poor relocated
(Gooptu 1997) or by changing their sanitation and housing conditions (De Swaan 1988). Although forced
evictions by government officials is a fact of life for Bangladeshi bustee or slum tenants (see Islam et al 1997), it
does not appear to be public health but property rights which are at issue in these evictions12.
Discussions about the morality of the poor provoked comparisons with the non-poor, and consistently
unflattering descriptions of elite morality. Crimes committed by the elite and other groups of the non-poor such
as mastaans (thugs) were characterised as far more serious than the petty crimes of the poor, which were
committed to feed starving families. Although religious leaders were inclined to see a general moral decline in
society, the poor were usually characterised as not only more moral than the rich, but less greedy, and more
contented with their simple, hardworking lives, particularly in rural areas:
Families in rural areas never think in terms of a motor car, a refrigerator, air conditioner and so
on. I lived in the village for nearly 15 years. I think I was quite satisfied about it. It's hot, you go
under the tree, you stay there for a while. Food, water you drink from the well, the pumps. Then
you cook twice a day, so you don't need a refrigerator. Whatever little you have you cook, these
are fresh things...that sort of life can be better. In Dhaka you drive, you have got all the tensions,
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you have got a lakh of taka in your hand but you have accumulated a lot of funds. So you go for
another lakh, and another – it's like a craze is going on. But that fellow, the meal for the next one
or two days - he doesn't bother about the rest of it …  I think they are quite satisfied (Former
Government Secretary, senior diplomat and educationalist).
As one prominent newspaper editor put it: 'one does not really fear the poor people. On the other hand …
poverty creates a sense of diffidence or dependence'. These qualities of diffidence and dependence combined
with an inherent honesty and simplicity supply a discourse of the poor - and particularly the rural poor - as both
absolutely and relatively unthreatening.
That the poor are not a menace may also be attributed to the elite's insulation against many of the
problems of the masses. The rich sections of the elite reside in what are designated 'posh residential suburbs',
and are geographically separated to an extent: for them the encroachment of slums and shanty-towns are little
more than an eyesore. Less wealthy members of the elite appear to perceive urban poverty as a greater threat to
their wellbeing – perhaps a reflection of their relative physical proximity to the poor. Another reason that
poverty poses only the weakest of threats to the elite seems to be their sense of mobility. The elite strive to
maintain their exit options, and foreign passports are prized, even among the richer elite. An NGO leader
explicitly stated that fears about the future of Bangladesh could encourage him to leave: 'I could just go away to
England and live there, if I am too worried for myself'. The exit option seems to be present for many of the
wealthier elite, and although perhaps not an entirely practical option, that it exists certainly seems to contribute
to the elite's psychological insulation from the problems and potential threat of poverty.
The elite also appear to believe that the possibility for tension between rich and poor is defused by the
appearance of concern for the condition of the poor:
Maybe we are largely shielded because our poor are not so violent. If they were violent it would
affect us very very much, because they are the majority. I don't worry about (the threat from
poverty). Because I believe that we are not terribly insensitive. We do care. There are of course the
super-rich and the defaulters who do not care. But by and large I think we do care (Former
Minister and Government Secretary).
Characteristically, 'other' sections of the elite were assumed to be negligent in their social and moral duties to
provide for the poor. Although government action is understood to be limited in its effectiveness – often
attributed to politicians' lack of patriotism and commitment to poverty reduction - NGO and private charitable
activities have more credibility, particularly because of their visibility. There seems to be a belief that the
visibility of charitable actions gives them the image of a caring elite, and that this carries considerable weight
with the poor themselves. Similarly, E.P. Thompson suggested that a moral economy could be seen as about the
negotiation of class relations: 'It shows how hegemony is not just imposed (or contested) ... and can be
sustained only by concession and patronage (in good times), by at least the gestures of protection in bad' (1993: 244-
345, emphasis added). Scott makes a similar argument when he claims that the ideological bases of the elite
public transcript generally have some resonance for those they claim to rule (Scott 1990: 18). At any rate, the
Bangladeshi elite appear to believe that their gestures of assistance do help to legitimate existing elite-poor
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relations. Where poverty has been viewed as a threat, descriptions of the poor have characteristically displayed
fear and loathing: the lack of a significant threat from poverty in Bangladesh seems to belie this need to
construct the poor as dangerous or bad.
7.2  Mutual Dependence and the Social Compact in Bangladesh
Metaphors of social compacts and bonds have generated ideas of mutual dependence between rich and poor in
a variety of contexts. In some historical studies of European elite perceptions of poverty, a belief in mutual
interdependence between rich and poor was a key ingredient in the elite consensus that action had to be taken
against poverty (Toye 1997). An organic metaphor for society was understood to characterise the poverty
discourse in sixteenth century England, in which society was depicted as the 'body commonwealth' with 'the
monarch …  as the head or the heart, magistrates as the eyes, artisans as the hands, and husbandmen as the feet'
(Beier 1983: 17). Mutual dependence and obligation between rich and poor were read off this metaphor for
society. Similarly, ideas of social exclusion within French discourse are understood to draw on a sense of the
rupture of the social bond, and/or of the disintegration of national solidarity. Do similar ideas of the
interconnectedness of society shape the Bangladeshi elite's perceptions of poverty?
There is some scope for suggesting that ideas of traditional elite responsibility - whatever the accuracy of
this reading of history – refer to mutual obligation and reciprocity. The elite appear to be referring to a form of
'moral economy' values, involving traditional Bengali virtues of indulgence and benevolence towards the poor
(Greenough 1985). On a very small scale, at least, these ideas seem to work by giving meaning to rich-poor
relationships. However, the emphasis for the elite is firmly on voluntarism, and far less on reciprocity, and
publicly, at least, the idea that assisting the poor should have any tangible benefit for the rich is condemned. It
may be that ideas of unselfish benevolence which have the most meaning for the elite, have been 'scaled-up' to
explain the relationship between the elite and the masses at a national level. But can such values provide the
basis for thinking about social interdependence?
To the extent that a social compact between rich and poor is present in any sense, its major referent would
seem to be the national liberation struggle. A symbolic contract between rich and poor is implicit in the united
sacrifice involved in the effort. The socialist leanings of the political groups which led the movement, and the
fact that the struggle was about economic as well as political equality, also give weight to this view. But the
symbol of the liberation movement holding a unified cultural and linguistic national identity together is heatedly
contested, with religion competing to define nationhood (Osmany 1992; Guhathakurta 1997). Guardianship of
the liberation struggle symbol is claimed by the Awami League, the party of the present government, that also
led the movement:
Nowhere else in the world is a nation divided into pro-independence and anti-independence
groups or powers. The anti-independence group is still effective - they don't love the land, so they
don't love the people. Another is the bureaucratic complexity - they work for themselves only. I
think people of different mentality cannot work for the poor people. (MP, Awami League).
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It is partly this guardianship which gives the ruling party a stronger claim to a pro-poor stance, as suggested by
the MP in the extract above. However, the partisan political nature of claims to identify the national community
may weaken the sense of a 'commonwealth' of rich and poor.
The weakness of the sense of interdependence between rich and poor in Bangladesh may also result in part
from the very scale of the poor population. Despite the large proportion of poor people in Bangladesh, there
may be enough educated, healthy people to fulfil the personnel needs of the elite. This perception was
highlighted in discussions of the personnel needs of the military. In the context of the Boer War the physical
and educational weakness of the average British soldier was of great concern, for example, but this is a problem
which Bangladeshi military leaders did not seem to consider. In response to direct questioning, one retired
Brigadier commented that 'there is no shortage of suitable people joining the army, we always get the best, so
poverty does not really affect us in that way'. Despite large-scale poverty, therefore, the elite may still have a
large pool of suitable people from which to draw their labour supply. In that sense, they do not 'need' the very
poor.
One final point about the weakness of a sense of social interdependence may be that some sections of the
Bangladeshi elite seem to identify more strongly with other country elites than with the rest of society. The 'exit
option' was mentioned above, and although it may not be a practical alternative for the elite, it is an option
which is present at some level. Foreign passports are highly prized, and one intellectual gave a detailed history
of periods of elite exit and re-entry coinciding with periods of political instability and opportunities for the elite.
Younger elites (and large sections of the middle classes) are now educated abroad, and many do not consider
returning on a permanent basis. Some respondents believed strongly that many of the richer sections of the elite
now identify more with 'the world elite', and certainly the social distance between the richest elites and the rest
of the population seems to be vast.
7.3  The Lack of Faith in the State
The scale of the poverty problem itself may not give the elite much confidence in its feasibility. Most of our
respondents put the proportion of poor people at more than half the population, which at 60 million is daunting
enough; the frequency of natural disasters also tend to mean a periodic erosion of the progress made by poor
people. Perhaps most importantly, however, the record of state-led poverty reduction is unconvincing, and the
elite display little confidence in the state's ability to reduce poverty directly (see Table 7); this is not surprising
given the lack of faith in the state's ability to even collect taxes (see Table 8).
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Table 7 :   Is  the government effective at  reducing poverty?
Non-state
elites
State (politicians, civil
& military bureaucrats)
elites
All
No 23 53% 9 36% 32 47%
Ambivalent 4 9% 1 4% 5 7%
Less effective than
NGOs
3 7% 0 0% 3 4%
Potentially 8 19% 8 32% 16 24%
Yes 5 12% 7 28% 12 18%
Total 43 100% 25 100% 68 100%
Table 8 :   Would you support  raising taxes for more and better  poverty al leviation
programmes?
Non-state elites State (politicians, civil
& military
bureaucrats) elites
All
No 11 26% 4 22% 15 25%
Ambivalent 2 5% 3 17% 5 8%
Collection is the problem 21 50% 7 39% 28 47%
Yes 8 19% 4 22% 12 20%
Total 42 100% 18 100% 60 100%
Conversely, there is some complacency about the successes of education and fertility control programmes,
which are considered acceptable methods of tackling poverty. With the exception of those involved in poverty
alleviation research or policy work, the elite are poorly informed about existing government programmes13, and
have even less information about their successes. Many members of the elite described such programmes as 'an
eyewash', and the outcome of governments leaping on successive donor-driven bandwagons:
(T)hese are all just fads, first poverty alleviation, then environment, then violence against women.
Everyone is talking, and nobody is doing anything about it. Nobody is studying, judging, planning
anything. We have no idea of how we can do it, we're just copying others (Jatiya Party MP).
There are no specific programmes, apart from things like vulnerable group feeding with the aid of
other organisations ... government should not take credit for these things, it's just acting as a
conduit (Former government secretary).
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There is clear consensus that the implementation of state programmes is plagued by corrupt and inefficient
management, and that there is a lack of united political commitment to poverty alleviation. In part these factors
are understood to be the inevitable outcomes of political history in Bangladesh, in particular the prolonged
periods of military rule:
Poverty is a great problem indeed and requires firm political commitment and also assurance of
policy sustainability, even if the governments change. Up to 1975 a civilian government existed,
after that it was interrupted by military rule. In my position I noticed senior posts occupied by
army officers… they would do anything to consolidate power, and poverty alleviation was a distant
matter to think of (Trade Union leader).
Those members of the elite who are brought in contact with poverty alleviation programmes showed more
optimism, but they tended to pinpoint specific cases of success. This was usually the Local Government
Engineering Department, which was understood to undertake the best rural development programmes as a
result of good personal leadership.
7.4  The Capacity  and Visibility of Non-Government Organisations
The low visibility and poor evaluation of state performance contrasts with the detailed information the elite
displayed about non-state organisations, specifically Grameen Bank, BRAC and a few other large NGOs.
Despite some serious concerns about their institutional status, they generally received warm praise for their
perceived successes. Indeed, most of the perceived improvements in the international image of Bangladesh were
attributed to the positive global media portrayal of Grameen Bank.
As others have suggested, the role of the NGOs, in particular the fact that the larger representatives
challenge government social service provision in scale and coverage, has been the subject of much discussion in
Bangladesh (Hashemi 1996; White forthcoming). Some of these discussions represent significant challenges to
the NGOs, focusing on the lack of formal accountability to the people, and the reliance on donor agendas. But
in our experience of talking with the elite, the dominant criticisms of the NGOs represent a shift in this
thinking. It is partly scale, but mostly the professionalisation of the NGO sector, with which the elite take issue.
The voluntary activities of the NGOs are praiseworthy …  (but) NGOs are getting huge amounts
of money from home and abroad and now they are only thinking for the expansion of their sphere
of influence, disbursing money and recovery of money. Their policies are adopted looking at their
foreign donors. Foreign donors have lost their confidence upon our government administration
since the NGOs have convinced the donors, making derogatory remarks against government and
spoiled our national image abroad in order to get funds. They also put pressure by donor status if
government fails to comply with them. NGOs and government can work jointly, but what about
their accountability?  I doubt their financial transparency. Their activities are salutary as long as
they are confined within the definition of voluntary activities. If they pursue interventionist policy
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in governmental decision-making, or attempt to protest fundamentalism, they must be resisted
(Religious leader).
Most sections of the elite have reasons for taking issue with the professional nature of NGO activity. Business
leaders usually emphasised the unequal treatment of NGO 'businesses' by government policy, often asserting
that they pay fewer taxes and therefore have an unfair competitive advantage. Members of the state elite14
stressed that better salary structures for NGO employees meant that they had an unfair administrative
advantage over government employees. Religious leaders, as illustrated above, keep a close eye on NGO
activities, and frame their objections in terms of the lack of accountability, and of voluntarism in NGOs. That
NGOs 'have become a business' is a popular topic of conversation among the elite; there are a number of
extremely high-profile NGO leaders who are identified as synonymous with their organisations, closely
paralleling the identification of large business houses with their founders/main owners (see also White
forthcoming). That many of the state elite are themselves believed to be setting up NGOs on retirement15 may,
cynically, be seen as testament to the profit potential of the NGO sector in Bangladesh16.
Arguments against the professionalisation of the NGO corps are easily justified, however, within the idiom
of charity. The pressure from the elite is evidently for non-state anti-poverty institutions to conform more
closely to voluntary and charitable models. A former civil servant devised one such model, which was published
in English language newspapers and praised by members of the elite. The central idea was that micro-finance
did not have to come from large, impersonal institutions; instead, the provision of micro-credit should be the
responsibility of individual wealthy citizens. This model was termed 'micro-finance from micro sources', and
emphasised its voluntary and personal nature, and in particular the building of social bonds between the rich
(citizens, 'those who can afford at least Tk.5,000') and poor members of 'their village'. Personal, rather than
target group selection would replace the need for peer group monitoring. That these ideas were approved of in
many elite quarters highlights the emphasis on the ideally voluntary and personal – charitable, in essence –
response to poverty. The major criticisms of the NGOs are thus framed as their insufficiently
charitable/voluntary character.
Despite the fears that (large) NGOs are becoming more like the state or business sectors than charities,
there was relatively little secular criticism of their activities, and a great deal of praise for their effectiveness.
This positive appraisal of NGOs does have the effect of downplaying government activity, on the one hand, but
raises other questions, in addition. Could the NGOs be seen as the elite's response to poverty, for example?
What is the extent of elite (as opposed to poor people's) involvement in and 'ownership'17 of NGOs?  A few
respondents suggested that the success of the NGOs in Bangladesh has to do with elite support for their
activities, without which they would not have succeeded to the extent they have done. Whether or not this is
indeed the case merits further study. Consider the proposition of an industrialist, one of the few respondents to
claim that the elite were feeling pressurised by poverty:
I think they are feeling this pressure building up, but they still don't know what to do about it.
And in fact I feel that a direct result of this pressure building up, is why these NGOs have been so
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successful. Because the NGOs could not have been successful had the elites not supported their
activities. So you see that there has been a tacit support for the NGOs' activities.
If the elite supported the NGOs, was this because NGOs constituted 'their' response to poverty, where the state
was unwilling, unable, or inappropriate to undertake action?  That is, do the elite feel that sufficient attention is
being paid to the problem of poverty through the activities of NGOs, so that further action is not urgent?
The second issue which the high-profile successes of the NGOs raises is that of ambivalence towards state
responsibility for the poor (see Table 5). As discussed above, this is an issue of some importance in Bangladesh,
as it is by no means clear that the elite have working models of state-led direct poverty reduction strategies.
Certainly the sheer capability displayed by the NGOs has led to a strong sense among some of the elite that
they, and not the state should be engaging directly in poverty reduction action:
In fact it is not whether (the government) should engage in anti-poverty work, their entire mission
should be to combat poverty, but there is a difference. Government should go in for attacking
poverty - a good government should do it on a macro-level, by putting an enabling environment in
place which attacks poverty. But one doesn't expect the government to go in and do the fieldwork
direct anti-poverty work - that should be left to the NGOs or the private sector or the charities or
whatever (Business leader).
This stress on comparative advantage and capability makes the issue of state responsibility recede into the
background, as debates on the implications of the 'NGOification' of Bangladesh have shown (Wood 1994;
Feldman 1997). The prominence of the large service-providing non-state institutions may further erode already
weak state capacity: 'If the state is no longer even nominally responsible for guaranteeing a minimum level of
welfare to its citizens, to whom should they complain when provision falls short?'  (White, forthcoming). The
importance of the perception that the state is not ultimately responsible, or is equally responsible as non-state
institutions, is clear: pressure for action cannot be put on an institution which is not clearly held responsible for
that action.
8   CONCLUSIONS
Bangladeshi elites do not consider poverty to be the most urgent problem facing Bangladesh. To some extent,
the fact that Bangladesh is as a whole a poor country means that separating out the obstacles facing poor
people, and those facing the development project as a whole, is conceptually tricky. There often seems,
therefore, to be little sense in focusing narrowly on pro-poor interventions such as safety nets, when broader,
pro-growth interventions are also understood to be in favour of poor people.
The elite are not wrong to think broadly about poverty alleviation; their views are often fully in line with
global academic and policy discourses. They also favour education, although as a means of removing the most
important obstacle they see the poor as facing – their lack of 'awareness'. But education may do little for those
currently living in destitution, and the elite are unwilling to see the government take the responsibility of
providing them with any form of social security which does not directly enhance their productivity. In part, the
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elite lack faith in the state, and see the micro-credit activities of the very high-profile NGOs as preferable to
state welfare provision. In part, also, they prefer to view responsibility for the poor as individual, traditionally
voluntary, personalised, and focused on selective, narrow welfare communities. Beliefs in the virtues of charity
are also strengthened by the positive coverage of Bangladesh's NGOs in the international media, which has
given them a far higher profile than any government programme.
Features of elite perceptions of poverty in other contexts are largely unimportant in Bangladesh. The elite
are well-insulated from, and have a detached relationship to, the poor. They have very little reason to view their
relationship with the poor as antagonistic, or even as interdependent. The poor are seen as homogenous and
moral. There is a reluctance to make the moral distinctions among sub-categories of the poor that have, in other
contexts, helped mobilise political support for tackling particular types of poverty around which, in other
contexts, elites have managed to build political pressure. Instead, the Bangladeshi elite stress the ethnic
homogeneity of their country. The elite itself is relatively homogenous, as are their views about poverty. But
there is some diversity. Some of the less orthodox – in particular some NGO leaders and activists who see their
role as organising the poor to pressurise the government for action – do represent a challenge to the status quo,
but one which in the current ideological climate is muted.
How might the elite's understandings of poverty change? There are some indications that the influx of
poor rural people into the major cities is already having an impact on the elite's well-being, although still
indirectly. If the elite were to view the poor as capable of affecting their welfare, this may well result in more
action. The recent decision by the Bangladesh Krishi Bank (a government bank) to provide poor city residents
with large loans to enable them to return to their villages, based on the belief that poverty drives rural-urban
migration, appears to be one such reaction. In addition, successes in attracting investment in low-cost labour-
intensive export industries may mean that the business elite become more reliant on the labour of the poor. The
increasing visibility and influence of business associations may mean that greater reliance on the poor brings
them into sharper policy focus.
This preliminary overview of findings from research on elite perceptions of poverty in Bangladesh draws
attention to a number of issues more usually sidelined in research on poverty within development studies.
Firstly, it treats the motivation to act on poverty as itself problematic. What is it that prompts governments or
societies to provide for the poor in the first place?  How can variations in the priority given to poverty be
explained?  Secondly, it relies on the locally relevant ideas, meanings, and language of poverty, to open a
discussion about the nature of provision for the poor. As historians have been able to show, provision for the
poor is not only about the actual nature and extent of poverty, nor solely to do with resource or technical
considerations, but is linked to different ideas about the poor, or even about intra-elite conflicts with no bearing
on poverty. Finally, it suggests that explanations about developing country failures to reduce poverty should
turn to local, and in particular, elite, perceptions of the urgency of the problem. These perceptions may in turn
derive from an understanding that some version of pro-poor growth will take care of the poverty problem in
time, and, like our Bangladeshi respondents, prefer to ignore the third 'prong', the safety nets, of that particular
anti-poverty strategy.
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NOTES
1 See Barua (1978), Sen (1987) and Khan et al (1996) on political elites; Rahman (1989) and Rahman (1991)
on administrative elites, and Sobhan and Sen (1988), Siddiqui et al (1991) and Kochanek (1993) for
business elites.
2 We devised an Index of Metropolitan Concentration to measure this phenomenon: the proportion of the
combined populations of the four largest cities that lived in the single largest city. This figure was 64% for
Bangladesh (Dhaka), with its population of 120 millions, compared to 36% for South Africa (Capetown),
with a total population of only 41 millions; 49% for Brazil (Sao Paulo); and 34% for India (Mumbai).
Among large poor countries, only Mexico has an Index of Metropolitan Concentration higher than that of
Bangladesh (Mexico City, 75%) (The Times Atlas of the World 1997: 64).
3 The Field Research Team included Abul Hossain (religious, student, Comilla), Sumana Alam (Rangpur),
Sabina Rashid (political), Reshmi Choudhury (civil bureaucrats, political, Chittagong), Satarupa Barua
(intellectual and political), and Naomi Hossain (all national except religious and student leaders, and overall
coordination)
4 Note that the third 'prong', safety nets, was absent from this account.
5 Interviews were conducted in English and Bangla, and most usually a mix of the two. Some of the elite
chose to speak in English, even when the interviewer's (and, we assumed, the interviewee's) first language
was Bangla. Even in interviews conducted mainly in Bangla, 'technical' terms were often in English.
6 From recent newspaper reports it seems that this programme was in fact launched in Tungipara, the Prime
Minister's home area.
7 Family planning is another area in which some of the elite consider the government to have been
successful. There is some complacency about these achievements, however, so that population control
does not seem to be the favoured solution for the future, although the scale of the current population is
still viewed as a problem.
8 See Blanchet (1996) for an account of the treatment of servants in middle-class homes in Dhaka.
9 Three prominent English language newspapers were reviewed over the four week period which covered
the extreme cold weather. More than twice as many articles were about donations than about those who
suffered from the cold.
10 There is a flourishing debate on poverty alleviation through zakat and other redistribution mechanisms
derived from Islam in the Pakistani Islamic economics literature (see issues of The Pakistan Development
Review). In at least one context, however, state collection of zakat has proven extremely unpopular with
the poor (Scott 1987).
11 Guhathakurta (1997) locates the ideological origins of the indigenous NGO movement, which could be
characterised as a 'social movement against poverty', as rooted in the nationalist movement, a point echoed
by the NGO leaders whom we interviewed.
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12 Significantly, it is in the public health rather than the economics of poverty literature that the 'general
threat' from poverty is raised, in a number of different public health contexts (see Harpham 1988; Lipson
1998; Skold 1998; Stephens 1996; Wallace 1997; Watt 1996; WHO 1997).
13 Only a tiny minority, for example, mentioned food distribution/ration schemes, perhaps because these are
universally understood to benefit the rich in Bangladesh. Slightly more attention was paid to public works
programmes.
14 The state elites obviously have direct competition as a reason for being critical of NGOs (see Lewis,
Sobhan and Jonsson (1994: 17) for an account of conflict within the government's NGO Affairs Bureau).
15 We are aware of at least one MP whom we interviewed who had set up an NGO prior to entering
Parliament, which had then been 'given' to a family member to run, as the European funders had
threatened to withdraw as they could not fund a politician's private activities.
16 One NGO leader informed us that applications for top administrative posts in the NGO sector came
predominantly from military and civil bureaucrats (not retired).
17 In Dhaka elite circles, founders and directors of NGOs are frequently described as 'owners' of the
organisations they manage. This is partly slippage, but also at times denotes a view of NGOs as a lucrative
business.
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